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Hawaiian Annexation.

SPEECH
OF
HON. MARION DE VRIES,
OF CALIFORNIA,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Tuesday, June 14, 1898.

The House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—

Mr. DE VRIES said:

Mr. SPEAKER: The close of the nineteenth and the opening of the twentieth century witness a radical change in the theater of the chief commercial and naval operations of the world.

The greater maritime commerce of the world is upon the Pacific. That boundless water early promises to be the scene of the great naval conflicts of the future. International conflicts almost invariably are the results of the struggles and sharp contests between nations in their endeavors to command the commerce of the world. The dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, the approaching completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the sudden appearance of Japan as a factor in the world's commerce and controversies, the development of Alaska and of the many islands of the Pacific and contiguous to the Orient have all attracted the genius, enterprise, and capital of the world.

Here is the world's most expansive field of commerce. Here are unlimited possibilities for capital, labor, and genius. Here is a boundless territory, inhabited by over 500,000,000 people yet in comparative primitiveness. From the world's scramble for advantages in the Orient will come the conflicts of the next century. Here in the Pacific will arise the complications: here will be congregated the great navies, and here fought the great battles of the twentieth century. Already the European powers are dividing the advantages there obtainable. The part our country is destined to share in this development will be easily acquired and sustained if we act promptly and properly.

With the "Key of the Pacific" and the Nicaragua Canal ours, controlling and directing the course of this commerce, at its eastern basis it will be controlled by the United States alone, while at its western basis it will be developed and divided by the combined energies and greed of Russia, England, Germany, France, Japan, and China. For our defense and commercial advantage it behooves the Republic to marshal its forces, secure itself in its outposts, and post its commercial agents for the coming struggle for this magnificent commerce and the possible wars of the future.

Representing in part as I do the great State of California, with 800 miles of coast line lying adjacent to the scenes of these activities, I believe I foresee correctly for that State immense commercial advantages and a great future. The Pacific coast is destined to outrival the Atlantic: Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles will inevitably outrival Portland, Boston,

P
M. W. A. Smith

New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston. It was the commerce of the Atlantic that made great the latter; it will be the greater commerce of the Pacific that will make greater the former.

California, with its millions of acres of fertile soil, its many rich mines, its infinite variety of productiveness, having every variety and character of land and climate, producing every variety and kind of produce, all in the infancy of their development, is destined by its contiguity to these new marts of the world and its relative position as the gateway of the world's future commerce, to become the richest country of the globe. The inevitable will bring to her farmers, her laborers, her manufacturers, demands of an infinite variety and quantity. Commerce is always reciprocal. Internal natural wealth and productiveness always respond to foreign trade, and the latter is essential to and develops the former.

As a great factor in the development of these resources and this commerce, as an impregnable defense thereof when developed, as well as of California's 800 miles of coast line, I shall vote for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

Believing as I do, and as I think can be conclusively demonstrated, that the ownership of these islands will render the Pacific coast perfectly impregnable from naval attack in case of war, I would consider the vote which failed to avail of their ownership inexcusable. To leave our great coast trade, our great coast cities, our many thousands of citizens subject to attack and destruction by a hostile navy, to jeopardize its future by the possibility of such, when for the acceptance only, without the asking for these islands, it is possible to render all of these free of the possibility of such, would be little short of criminal. These considerations entail such grave consequences to the Pacific coast that they become national in importance. The debate upon this question discloses these to be moving factors in support of the pending resolution. My reasons, therefore, in supporting the same, while primarily local, are essentially national.

PEARL HARBOR DEFENSELESS AND VALUELESS WITHOUT ANNEXATION—
WITH ANNEXATION WE ARE IMPREGNABLE AGAINST NAVAL ATTACK ON
THE WEST.

Patient attention to this debate discloses that all the opponents of annexation admit the necessity of our Government having a coaling and supply station at Pearl Harbor in these islands, and they assert as a part of their argument that having this already, annexation adds nothing to our advantage or defense.

There is no escape from the very patent fact that for military operations on the Pacific this station is imperatively necessary. The admission of this undeniable fact by the opponents of annexation concedes the one point in the case fatal to their contention and which demonstrates annexation of Hawaii necessary to our defense.

It is not necessary to rest the case of annexation upon the questionable title we hold to that harbor. Our right thereto, as known to all, was acquired by a treaty of reciprocity, wherein we granted Hawaii the right to export to the United States certain articles free of duty, and in return therefor she granted us the right we claim in Pearl Harbor. Before this treaty was concluded the Hawaiian minister addressed a letter to the then Secretary of State Bayard, inquiring if the interpretation of the treaty by our Government was not that in case of revocation of the treaty we should surrender the harbor, to which the Secretary replied in the affirm-

ative. Thereupon the treaty was concluded. The treaty is terminable upon one year's notice.

At most then, admitting the stability of present conditions, we have but a precarious title to that harbor, not one that would justify its fortification, for certainly if the treaty is terminated our Government can not in honor insist upon holding the consideration therefor, especially as it was undoubtedly concluded with the contrary understanding. Waiving, however, this important inquiry and further waiving the important question of whether or not under the treaty we have a right to anything more than the water surface constituting the harbor and no right to any adjacent land for supply stores, shops, etc., we are confronted with an insurmountable objection which, coupled with the necessity of an impregnable harbor here, demonstrates annexation necessary.

It is admitted by everyone and on all sides that Pearl Harbor is the only harbor in the Sandwich Islands that can be made a naval station and base of supplies.

We have heard much in the arguments by the opponents to annexation about fortifying this harbor as a "Gibraltar." That is all that is necessary, they say. That should be done, they say; and for this reason annexation, they claim, is unnecessary. But the weakness of this argument lies in the fact that demonstrates annexation necessary, and that is that Pearl Harbor can not be made a Gibraltar, can not be made impregnable, can not be invulnerably fortified without occupying Honolulu and the whole of the Island of Oahu; and we can not occupy these without annexing all the Hawaiian Islands. It would be idle to talk of annexing the capital of Hawaii without annexing all the islands. No one would even suggest such an idea.

The topography of the country is such and the situation such that to successfully fortify Pearl Harbor is a physical impossibility without occupying Honolulu. Pearl Harbor is a typical naval harbor. It is said by naval experts that it would be without a superior in the world if fortified from land attacks, which can be easily and cheaply done. A coral reef protects its entrance without, so that no ship can enter save at a certain point upon which can easily be trained modern guns that could defy the navies of the world. Through this reef the entrance of the harbor winds through a narrow and deep channel to a deep bay on the interior large enough to accommodate all the navies of the earth. It is just seven miles from the channel entering Pearl Harbor proper to Honolulu. To the west of a line between Honolulu and Pearl Harbor is a hill, Leitoa, 485 feet high. This hill is susceptible of being cheaply and impreguably fortified by modern guns, which would at once command Pearl Harbor and Honolulu and could destroy with impunity every ship or man-of-war attempting to enter this harbor and demolish that city.

Back of Honolulu, and within three-quarters of a mile of Honolulu Harbor, stands another hill called the "Punch Bowl," 498 feet high, likewise susceptible of being cheaply and impreguably fortified, and from which modern guns could destroy any ship or war vessel entering or departing from Pearl Harbor. Northeast from Honolulu, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, is a third hill—Diamond Head—761 feet high, likewise susceptible of fortification and commanding the harbor and city of Honolulu and adjacent coast. Each of these hills is approached by almost perpendicular walls. Back of all these hills is a mountain range the only pass across which is a nar-

row defile about 20 feet wide, of over 1,200 feet elevation, and this is the only pass from the west by which Pearl Harbor or Honolulu can be approached. The sides of the mountain are almost perpendicular for a thousand feet. A few men at this pass could hold it against thousands. It is a veritable Thermopylae. Military experts agree that for a nominal expense, less than the cost of one battle ship, all these points can be so fortified that the navies of the world could not enter Pearl or Honolulu harbor nor could the armies of the world assault these by land. Here is the much-desired "Gibraltar," defended by an equally desirable "Thermopylae." It will not be contended, however, that we acquired Honolulu by the reciprocity treaty, yet without it Pearl Harbor will afford no refuge for our war ships, for they could be bombarded from Honolulu or any of the points named. The Island of Oahu, upon which is situated the capital of Hawaii, can for a comparatively nominal sum be made a Gibraltar and a Thermopylae. Without all of this island Pearl Harbor is defenseless and useless. But Oahu can only be acquired by annexing Hawaii.

The inevitable induction, then, from the admission of the necessity of a coaling and repairing station and harbor at Pearl Harbor is the annexation of all of these islands.

No one has given more careful study to the strategic value and possibilities of Hawaii and the detailed necessities to make it such than Lieut. Lucien Young. He was an attaché of the *Boston*, stationed at Honolulu at the time of the revolution. He commanded the United States artillery landed at that time for the protection of American interests. During the long stay there he made a careful study of the country, distances, etc. His report, forbidden publication by the Cleveland Administration, is now published by him in book form. It should be read by all students of this great question. In part he says:

A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION.

The importance of Hawaii as a strategical position is no more a matter of opinion than is a geometrical axiom. It is a primal, incontrovertible fact. It is second in importance to no other single point on the earth's surface. England seized, and with bulldog tenacity has held, Gibraltar for its strategical value alone; but there is no country the route to which lies past Gibraltar which can not be reached by several other different ways. The distinctive feature of Hawaii, wherein it is unique among the strategical points of the world, is that it lies at the center of an area so great that commercial and military operations across it are practically impossible except by using Hawaii as a coal and supply station. Eliminate Hawaii from the map, and there are scarcely any battle ships in existence which can operate across the Pacific, by reason of the fact that they can not carry coal enough, and the problem of coaling at sea has not yet been solved.

It has been repeatedly and officially pointed out by the naval authorities, not only of the United States but of the world that the trans-Pacific countries and islands, with the exception of Hawaii, are so far distant from the American continent that unless the ships of such nations can recoil at Hawaii it is practically impossible for them to get to the Pacific coast for the purpose of conducting military operations there. The most efficient ships could not get there at all, and those which do carry sufficient coal to cross would have no coal with which to operate, much less to return to their base of operations. In other words, it is impossible to maintain naval or military operations at a distance of from 3,500 to 5,500 miles from a base of operations. Under these conditions it is elementary strategy and logic that there can be no surer defense to the Pacific coast of the United States than to prevent any other foreign country from getting possession or control of Hawaii.

THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE.

Notwithstanding the certainty of the defense which would be afforded to the Pacific coast by excluding a possible enemy from Hawaii, it would not be policy for the United States to attempt this method of defense by herself taking possession of Hawaii, unless that possession could be made effective at reasonable expense.

Whether this can be done is not a new question to American naval authorities or statesmen.

As long ago as 1851 Congress, by formal resolution, requested the Navy and War Departments to report upon the conditions and requirements of the coast defenses of the United States. By instructions to the Navy Department Admiral Dupont drew up a report in reply to this resolution, in which he said, in connection with the defense of the Pacific coast:

"It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and importance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands, they would prove the most important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific Ocean—an acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in those seas."

This opinion has been fully approved by United States naval officers from that day to this. That United States control of Hawaii can be made both effective and economical is demonstrated by a brief examination of the facts.

FEW SECURE PORTS.

Although the Hawaiian Islands are eight in number and extend over a distance of about 400 miles, with the exceptions of Honolulu and Pearl harbors its ports are all open roadsteads, in which vessels are compelled to lie at distances of approximately half a mile from shore, obliged at all times to land and ship all freight in small boats, hampered by the restless swell of the ocean and exposed to constant interruptions by storms. The port of Hilo could be partially protected by building a breakwater several miles long, at an expense of an unestimated number of millions of dollars, but even then it would not be protected from northerly storms. With the exception, therefore, of Honolulu and Pearl harbors, all other points in the islands may be eliminated from consideration as possible naval stations.

Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor are both located upon the south side of the island of Oahu, and are only 7 miles apart. Any effective military control of the one must necessarily include the control of the other, for they are so close together that heavy artillery located at either point would be within easy range and have full control of the other.

Fortifications for the defense of the two need be of the most inexpensive kind. Both Honolulu and Pearl harbors are protected by natural fortifications, which need nothing but the placing of the guns to become impregnable. Three miles east of Honolulu, projecting out into the deep water, its summit only about a quarter of a mile from the water's edge, rises Diamond Head, a hill of solid rock, with an almost perpendicular face, reaching an elevation of 550 feet.

NATURAL FORTIFICATIONS.

In the very heart of Honolulu, with three-quarters of a mile of deep water, lies a second hill of solid rock, with almost perpendicular face, rising to an elevation of 500 feet. Four miles west of Honolulu, just half way to Pearl Harbor, lies a third hill of the same rocky, perpendicular character, reaching an elevation of 400 feet. A battery of modern guns can be mounted on each of these three hills at so little expense as to practically eliminate the amount as a factor for consideration as an estimate of cost. To the rear of Honolulu the only pass through the mountain is a narrow cut, 20 feet wide, to approach which an invading army would have to climb an almost perpendicular bluff nearly 1,000 feet high, which would preclude any attack from that direction.

Honolulu is an absolutely safe, landlocked harbor, but is unsuitable for a naval station for two reasons: First, because it is so small that it will not accommodate more than 100 vessels at the outside, and the rapidly growing commercial use of the port will very soon tax its limit to the utmost. In the second place, the shores of the harbor are distant only from a half to three-quarters of a mile from deep water. The dry docks, machine shops, and magazines of a naval station should be located at such a distance from deep water as to practically put them beyond the reach of an ordinary bombardment. While Honolulu can be so fortified as to absolutely prevent an effective landing being made, it lies so close to deep water that a heavy battle ship might easily, before being driven off, annihilate the effectiveness of the station by a few well-directed shots.

Pearl Harbor is an arm of the sea, a lagoon, connected with the ocean by a long, narrow, river like entrance, some 3 miles in length, the inner end expanding and dividing into three locks, having together an interior frontage of some 30 miles, with an average depth of from 20 to 60 feet. Its banks are formed of coral and sandstone, with a top layer of soil. In many places the banks are so perpendicular that a full-rigged ship could lie alongside without excavation or dock building. The entire harbor is surrounded by abundant springs of pure, fresh water, and artesian wells reach fresh water at any point at a depth of approximately 400 to 425 feet, which rises to an elevation of about 30 feet above sea level. The shores are well wooded with algeroba forests and the country on the land side is a rich, fertile district, covered with rice, banana, and sugar plantations, capable of furnishing an unlimited amount of fresh supplies for the use of the station.

A CONVENIENT REEF.

A barrier reef extends parallel with and distant about a mile from the shore, and the water beyond does not reach a depth of over 100 feet for a distance of about another mile, being well snited, therefore, for marine mining. These, with the assistance of the fortifications already spoken of and inexpensive fortifications at the mouth of the harbor, would be absolutely prohibitive of any successful attack upon the station from the sea. The Navy and War Departments have already executed most minute surveys of the harbor and its entrance, and caused expert reports to be made thereon. As early as 1872 Generals Schofield and Alexander, of the United States Army, reported unequivocally in favor of the military value of this harbor to the United States.

The surveys of the Navy Department have been made under the direction of Admirals Irwin, Walker, and Miller. They disclose that there is a sand bar across the extreme outer entrance of the harbor, consisting almost exclusively of soft, disintegrated coral sand, which can be disposed of by a suction dredge at an estimated expense of not to exceed \$150,000. The rise and fall of the tide is less than 3 feet, and there are no currents which need be feared to re-form the bar. A bar similar in character, somewhat smaller in extent, was pumped out from the entrance to Honolulu Harbor in 1891, a depth of over 30 feet being secured, which has not since changed a particle. The expense of clearing the Honolulu Harbor bar, exclusive of the cost of the dredge, was only about \$40,000. This dredge is the property of the Hawaiian Government, and is available at any time for use by the United States Government at Pearl Harbor if desired.

TREATY RIGHTS.

The United States now has by the treaty the right to the exclusive use of Pearl Harbor, but has as yet taken no step other than making the surveys mentioned to avail itself of this privilege. A popular view has been that the rights which the United States possesses in Pearl Harbor are all that the United States needs in a military way. This is an erroneous view. In the first place, there are doubts as to the permanency of the title of the United States to the harbor. The Hawaiian Government, both the monarchy and the republic, maintains that the United States title to the harbor is co-terminus with the existing reciprocity treaty, and that if such treaty is terminated the American rights to Pearl Harbor terminate also.

Be that as it may, there is no grant of territory by that treaty, and as a protective measure it would be necessary for the United States to own not only the land on which its naval station is located, but it should be able to control the territory for a sufficient distance away therefrom to insure the nonoccupation of a hostile power. The report of Generals Schofield and Alexander in 1872 laid especial stress upon this point. At that time, basing their opinion upon the then efficient range of cannon, they reported that the United States should secure territory for a distance of not less than 4 miles in every direction from the harbor. Since then the efficient range of heavy artillery has greatly increased. Honolulu lies only 7 miles from Pearl Harbor, well within range.

There certainly can be no claim advanced that by the reciprocity treaty, which gives the United States the authority to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, it was intended to cede to the United States the jurisdiction over the territory occupied by Honolulu, the capital city of the country, and yet without possession or control of Honolulu there is no safety in locating a naval station at Pearl Harbor. The necessary corollary of this situation is that in order to make use of Pearl Harbor the control of Honolulu must also be acquired.

A DEFINITE ALTERNATIVE.

It is not within the bounds of consideration that the people of Hawaii would consent to segregate the city of Honolulu from the country and transfer it to the United States. The proposition which the United States must then face is to take the islands as a whole, or Pearl Harbor is of no value to it. In other words, the question is reduced down to the single issue of annexing the group as a whole or letting it go as a whole. Another matter of vital importance in arriving at a decision of this issue is the certainty that it will be almost impossible to eject any strong maritime power which once intrenches itself in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

On the other hand, if the United States first occupies this stronghold of the Western World, it will give it the dominant power over the entire North Pacific, both from a naval and a commercial standpoint, and afford a military protection to its Pacific coast and a control over the trans-Pacific commerce which can be attained in no other way.

If any of the leading maritime nations obtain that control, they can be evicted therefrom only by such expenditure of blood and treasure as will make the effort one of the great naval and military feats of history; and, until such eviction, it will be the one focus in the northern Pacific from

which hostile military expeditions can be flung out against our coast and commerce, now greater in the Pacific than in any other ocean, can be swept from off the face of the sea.

That I should make no mistake in distances, which constitute the force of his argument, I have verified the same from the official Hawaiian map in the archives of the Coast and Geodetic Survey and found them absolutely correct. This of itself shows Lieutenant Young to have been a close student of this question, as others speaking of the question and in this debate vary in their statements on the points of these distances. There is no variance between Lieutenant Young's statement and the official survey.

With these islands a part of our dominion, impreguably fortified, as they are capable of being, the Pacific coast would enjoy complete immunity from sea attack.

No war craft existing or known to the world can carry sufficient coal to cross the Pacific and operate against our coast and return. Indeed, none such can ever cross and return by reason of the fact that sufficient coal can not be carried for that purpose. There are no other islands in the Pacific that will fulfill such purposes. Acquiring these islands, therefore, means a complete natural defense of the Pacific coast. Nothing short of annexation will, however, make this defense complete.

The converse is equally true, as stated by Lieutenant Young. Should an enemy acquire them and operate therefrom as a base of supplies, no power on earth could dislodge this enemy, who, operating therefrom as a base of supplies and operations upon the great commerce and cities of the Pacific coast, would create irreparable disaster. We could possibly, by appropriating thousands of millions of dollars therefor, fortify every point on that coast, but we could not with that fully protect our commerce from such attack even with a mighty navy added; for the attacking party always gathers its force to a known point, while the party attacked never knows where the blow is to be struck.

With Hawaii fortified, therefore, we have an outpost impregnable to all attack and from which our Navy can sweep the Pacific, assailing in the rear any fleet attempting an assault upon our coast, attacking at a distance any such, and rendering helpless by denial of coal supplies any enemy approaching across the Pacific.


With Hawaii, therefore, we will be masters of the Pacific, commanding and protecting at once Alaska, the Pacific coast, and the eastern terminus of the Nicaragua Canal.

Gentlemen have suggested a coaling station at Unalaska. Outside of the incontrovertible argument that this route is rejected for sufficient reasons by navigators, the necessity which argues the acquisition of the Unalaska coaling station equally as strongly argues the necessity for the acquisition of the only other practicable coaling station in the Pacific, Hawaii, which is also a station of defense of incalculable value.

It should be borne in mind that one of the chief strategic values of Hawaii will be the defense of the western entrance to the Nicaragua Canal when constructed. To this point Hawaii is almost 2,000 miles nearer than Unalaska. From a commercial standpoint all vessels bound from the Orient via Nicaragua Canal would be compelled to call at Hawaii for supplies. Certainly none of them would go 2,016 miles farther north for such to Unalaska.

No words can so forcibly illustrate the strategic and commercial value of Hawaii to the United States as the map, showing in miles the relative position thereof in the Pacific, which I will here insert as a part of my consideration of this question.

Map of the Pacific Ocean and the Hawaiian Islands.



ANNEXATION MEANS A SMALLER ARMY AND NAVY.

With this impregnable harbor commanding our western coast, capable of accommodating our entire Navy, and which can be defended against the navies and armies of the world without the use of a single battle ship by the manning of fortifications on land, we have minimized the cost of future Pacific coast defense. Instead of annexation requiring an additional navy to defend these islands, these islands will, when necessary, defend the Navy.

Our possession of them, properly fortified and used as a base of supplies for our ships, while rendering the Pacific coast free from attack, will at the same time decrease the requirements of a strong navy to defend every point of that coast. Especially is this true should the islands come into possession of a hostile country. The topography of the country will enable us by modern fortifications, with the service of local militia and volunteers, to hold it against all hostile comers.

Annexation, therefore, means economy, means a smaller navy, means a smaller army to render impregnable our western shores.

THIS VIEW SUPPORTED BY ALL NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPERTS

Not only is the strategic value of Hawaii asserted and the advisability of annexation supported by the facts and opinions cited, but also by an unbroken line and unanimity of opinion of our naval and military experts. We educate many of these gentlemen at public expense in order to avail our country of their technical knowledge; we commit to their knowledge and judgment in time of war the lives of our citizens, our property, and our country. From their ranks spring such men as Dewey and Hobson, whose genius and bravery excite the applause of the world and command the expressed admiration of the enemy. Their opinions, therefore, in matters environed by conditions calling for such should be accepted by us as conclusive. At least this must be true when these opinions are reinforced by the criterion of practical common sense.

The following are a few of the many of this order of merit.

An English authority, the London Times, states:

The narrow, land-locked inlet or lagoon named Pearl River Harbor is in itself small in extent, but it is of inestimable value to any civilized nation possessing it and using it for naval purposes. In the deep waters of this sheltered lake not only the armed ships of the United States, but of all countries may find peace and perfect security. The maritime power which holds Pearl River Harbor and moors her fleet there holds also the key of the North Pacific.

George W. Melville, Chief Engineer of the United States Navy, one of the recognized leading naval engineers of the age, has recently written upon this question as follows:

MODERN WAR LIKE A THIEF IN THE NIGHT.

It is true that we are wholly at peace with these nations, and that since the United States desires no Asiatic territory, but is interested only in the full maintenance of its treaty rights with Eastern peoples, there would seem to be no probable cause for a clash. Yet modern war is sometimes like a "thief in the night," coming swiftly and without warning. Jomini, a master of strategy, has said, "No enemy is so insignificant as to be despised or neglected by any power, however formidable."

A wise state should apply the same reasoning to possible foes. Again, he says, "Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military strength," an answer wholly apt to the argument of those who, calm in the consciousness of present peace, would rely upon the unsurpassed wealth of the United States and our limitless resources to meet the stress of sudden war, remembering the "gold" only, and forgetting the vital "iron" of military strength.

HAWAII BRIDGES A SEA OTHERWISE IMPASSABLE.

And so while at this time we are wholly at peace on the Pacific, and the breadth of that wide ocean lies between us and the arsenals of nations which

may some time be hostile to us, yet it must be remembered that in a moment peace may fade and that Hawaii bridges the stretch of sea which without the island group would be at this stage in the development of marine propulsion impassable to an enemy's fleet.

PEARL HARBOR THE KEY TO WESTERN DEFENSE.

Pearl Harbor is the sole key to the full defense of our western shore, and that key should lie in our grasp only.

WHY HAWAII IS A STRATEGIC POINT AND MADEIRA NOT.

Hawaii's unique advantages as a strategic point of prime importance have been set forth so ably and so often as to forbid their citation here. One or two objections raised by not a few nontechnical critics may, however, be considered.

Pearl Harbor is 2,100 miles from our western coast, and Madeira is about the same distance from our eastern shore. The latter has little, if any, military value. Why, then, should Hawaii, parted by the same stretch of sea, exceed it in importance?

PACIFIC SO BROAD WAR SHIPS MUST RECOAL AT HAWAII.

The critics forget that the paramount worth of the Hawaiian group in war will lie, first, in the fact that the Pacific is so broad that its passage will exhaust the coal supply of a war vessel, making necessary a renewal at Honolulu; and, second, in the isolation of the group, with the absence of other land between it and our coast. If the Pacific were as narrow as the Atlantic, or if other islands intervened—as with Madeira—between our western shore and Hawaii, the strategic value of the latter would be largely reduced.

PEARL HARBOR IMPREGNABLE.

Again, it has been urged that if we shall take the group we shall but acquire territory to defend—an element not of strength, but of weakness, in war, and one which will make necessary large additions to our fleet. Pearl Harbor can be made an impregnable ocean fortress. It is true that one does not wage war with fortresses. It is also true, however, that they form vantage points from which a force may sally and under whose wing that force may supply and recruit for fresh attack. If Hawaii in naval conflict shall have no useful function in this, then it would seem that, through the wars of all time, the eager strife for the possession of fortresses, of guarded ports, of frontier outposts, has been false strategy, an error militarily.

ENEMY ATTACKING WESTERN COAST MUST FIRST CONTROL HAWAII.

As to the dread of the economist or of the altruist, that annexation will require largely augmented naval strength, it may be said that if an adequate force of the United States be stationed at Hawaii and its coast communications be properly guarded, an enemy from over sea would violate some of the cardinal principles of naval strategy and invite sure disaster in attacking our western shores without first blockading or defeating the Hawaiian squadron. The force of Pearl Harbor should then form simply but the first line of defense. Then the seagoing ships "fit to lie in a line," with their torpedo auxiliaries should be gathered to meet first the assault, leaving the coast guard to the reserve of torpedo craft and monitors stationed at fortified ports. The strength of the squadron at this mid-Pacific outpost should be, doubtless, sufficient to meet the enemy, but the force on the coast could be reduced.

Captain Mahan, whose writings upon naval science are of such merit as to have been translated into many foreign languages, has written as follows upon this subject:

It is one of the most important strategic points in the world. It stands alone, having no rival and admitting no rival. It is the one spot in the Pacific from the equator on the south to Alaska on the north, and between America on the east and Asia on the west, where water, food, or coal can be obtained. It is also on or near the principal trade routes across the Pacific. Its unique position is what has given it the name of the "cross-roads" of the Pacific, the "key of the Pacific," the "Gibraltar of the Pacific."

THE POSSESSION OF HAWAII WILL STRENGTHEN THE UNITED STATES.

1. From a military point of view the possession of Hawaii will strengthen the United States. Of course, as is constantly argued, every addition of territory is an additional exposed point; but Hawaii is now exposed to pass under foreign domination—notably Japan—by a peaceful process of overrunning and assimilation. This will inevitably involve its possession by a foreign power—a grave military danger to us—against which preoccupation by the United States is, in my judgment, the only security.

A LARGER NAVY NECESSARY WITHOUT THAN WITH HAWAII.

2. In replying to the second question I must guard myself from being understood to think our present Pacific fleet great enough for probable con-

tingencies. With this reservation a greater navy would not be needed for the defense of the Pacific coast than would be required with the islands unannexed. If we have the islands, and in the Pacific a fleet of proper force, the presence of the latter, or of an adequate detachment from it, at the Hawaiian Islands will materially weaken if not wholly cripple any attempted invasion of the Pacific coast (except from British Columbia), and consequently will proportionately strengthen us.

With a fleet of the same size, and Hawaii unoccupied by either party, the enemy would at least be in a better position to attack us; while if he succeeded in establishing himself in any of our coast anchorages, he would be far better off. For in the latter case the islands would not menace his communications with home, which they would if in our possession, because Hawaii flanks the communications.

It is obvious also that if we do not hold the islands ourselves we can not expect the neutrals in the war to prevent the other belligerent from occupying them, nor can the inhabitants themselves prevent such occupation. The commercial value is not great enough to provoke neutral interposition. In short, in war we should need a larger navy to defend the Pacific coast, because we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent, by naval force, an enemy from occupying the islands; whereas, if we had pre-occupied them, fortifications could preserve them to us.

COALING AT SEA IMPRACTICABLE.

4. Coal can be transported in colliers, but as yet it can not be transshipped at sea with either rapidity or certainty. Even if it be occasionally practicable to coal at sea, the process is slow and uncertain. Reliance upon such means only is, in my judgment, impossible. A base must be had, and, except the ports of our own coast, there is none to be named alongside of Hawaii.

Admiral Porter, in an official report with reference to Hawaii, states:

European commerce, customs, enterprise, and ideas of government are making rapid strides all over that vast ocean [Pacific], a theater on which nature seems to have intended the United States should exercise the principal control.

And he deprecates the occupancy of those islands by any other power as follows:

They could launch forth their ships of war upon us with perfect impunity, * * * and in the event of war we should be driven from the Pacific. * * * Every consideration points to the absolute necessity of obtaining for the United States a paramount influence there.

Admiral Du Pont has also officially reported in language similar upon the necessity of these islands as a natural Pacific coast defense:

In the Pacific we already have outposts on our flanks in the hands of first-class powers. It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and importance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands, they would prove the most important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific Ocean, an acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in those seas.

And Admiral Belknap states:

ANNEXATION OF MOMENTOUS INTEREST AND VITAL IMPORTANCE.

To the people of the United States the present situation is of momentous interest and of vital importance. Indeed, it would seem that nature had established that group to be ultimately occupied as an outpost, as it were, of the great Republic on its western border and that the time had now come for the fulfillment of such design.

A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer the great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic point and commercial center. Situated in mid-North Pacific, the group looks out on every hand toward grand opportunities of trade, political aggrandizement, and polyglot intercourse. * * *

The group now seeks annexation to the United States; the consummation of such wish would inure to the benefit of both peoples, commercially and politically. Annex the islands, constitute them a Territory, and reciprocal trade will double within ten years. Let the islanders feel that they are once and forever under the folds of the American flag, as part and parcel of the great Republic, and a development will take place in the group that will at once surprise its people and the world.

FAILURE TO ANNEX WOULD BE FOLLY.

Not to take the fruit within our grasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would be folly, indeed—a mistake of the gravest character, both for the statesmen of the day and for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises.

Our statesmen should act in this matter in the spirit and resolve that secured to us the vast Louisiana purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of California. The Administration that secures to the United States the "coign of vantage" in the possession of those beautiful islands will score a great measure of beneficent achievement to the credit side of its account. * * *

To which may be added contributions from the pen of that invaluable contributor to military science, General Schofield:

From the time, twenty-five years ago, when I made a personal examination for the purpose of ascertaining the value of those islands to this country for military and naval purposes, I have always regarded ultimate annexation of the islands to this country as a public necessity. But the time when this should be accomplished had to depend on natural political development. In the meantime our national interests should be secured by the exclusive right to occupy, improve, and fortify Pearl River Harbor, so as to insure our possession of that harbor in time of war.

PEARL HARBOR MUST BE HELD AT ANY COST.

To illustrate my views on this subject, I have likened that harbor to a commanding position in front of a defensive line which an army in the field is compelled to occupy. The army must occupy that advanced position and hold it, at whatever cost, or else the enemy will occupy it with his artillery, and thus dominate the main line. If we do not occupy and fortify Pearl River Harbor, our enemy will occupy it as a base from which to conduct operations against our Pacific coast and the isthmian canal, which must, of course, in due time, be constructed and controlled by this country. The possession of such a base at a convenient distance from our Pacific coast would be a great temptation to an unfriendly nation to undertake hostile operations against us.

PEARL HARBOR CAN BE DEFENDED WITHOUT A NAVY.

One of the greatest advantages of Pearl River Harbor to us consists in the fact that no navy would be required to defend it. It is a deep, landlocked arm of the sea, easily defended by fortifications placed near its mouth, with its anchorage beyond the reach of guns from the ocean.

No halfway measures will suffice. We must accept the islands and hold and govern them or else let some other great nation do it. To fail now to carry into effect our own great national policy upon the first occasion offered to us would, in my judgment, be one of those blunders which are worse than crimes.

It would be idle to multiply opinions upon this subject or to attempt to add to the value, weight, or conviction borne by those already cited.

It seems to me, therefore, that the advisability of annexation from a strategic standpoint is not only established by the logic of the situation and the opinions of those entitled to be given weight, but is a geometrical axiom capable of absolute demonstration.

THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF HAWAII, A PROTECTORATE, AND THE MINORITY REPORT.

Wisdom in legislation, particularly in matters of great national concern, involving the possibility of the national defense, requires that every apparent possible contingency be provided against. The occasion having arisen when this Government is called upon to finally adopt a course with reference to this question, at this last opportunity this Congress should not leave the country exposed to any subsequent embarrassment.

It will be conceded by all that Hawaii is incapable of independent existence. Of small area and population, of limited wealth and revenues, without any navy or army, she is incapable, in times of foreign or domestic complications, which confront every government from time to time, of maintaining an independent sovereignty. More particularly is this true as her strategic posi-

tion in the Pacific makes her the object of the jealousies of other nations and consequent subject of controversies.

It has, therefore, been the history of these islands that they have been tossed about from one domination to another, foreign and domestic. All of its governments have sought the strong arm of some foreign power upon which to lean their precarious political existence. Four times in the past eighty-four years has she been taken possession of—once by Russia, twice by France, and once by England. In the past her quasi-political identity has been preserved solely by the moral support given that existence by this Government.

It is idle to multiply arguments upon this proposition, however, for the argument is foreclosed by the minority report upon this resolution, which asserts the necessity of a quasi protectorate over these islands by this Government.

For my part I am unable to appreciate either the cogency of the logic or the consistency of the opposition here that asserts at once that the people of these islands are a savage, ignorant, leprous, and undesirable population and at the same time demands that we become by a protectorate responsible for their conduct with all nations without having the right to control their actions. If their condition is as stated, nothing short of annexation can justify any assumption of responsibility for that people by us.

While the moral support of this country has sufficed in the premises in the past, we are now confronted by new conditions demanding different treatment.

In the progress of the century these islands have increased in importance. The lethargy of the Pacific is disturbed by a rapidly increasing commerce. Its quiet is viewing the gradual assembling here of the great navies of the world. To the west with gigantic strides Japan is suddenly thrust into the horizon, ambitious, powerful, grasping. Activity will supplant the quietude of the Pacific.

Local conditions in Hawaii have changed. A Republic has supplanted a monarchy, a Republic whose principles and government are similar to ours and whose creation and perpetuity were and are manifestly contingent upon absorption within and annexation to our Government. A silent but dreadful enemy is present in a majority population, under any general franchise, of Japanese who demand and whose country demands for them political liberty in Hawaii, the right to participate in the law and treaty-making power, without renouncing their allegiance to their native Japan. Japan has covetous eyes upon Hawaii and will take her at the first opportunity, by peace if possible, by force if necessary.

The repeated declarations of our Presidents and Congress certainly assure Hawaii that she has and would always have our moral support. But in the presence of and under this protection new conditions bring home to her the truth that this will no longer avail. By peaceful evolution or by war, if Hawaii is not annexed to the United States by the pending resolution, she will pass into the possession of some foreign power, leaving as the alternative to us her loss or recovery at the cost of an expensive war.

The student of existing conditions can not escape this conclusion.

If we reject this resolution and the treaty pending, how can we longer expect to maintain a protectorate over Hawaii? The present Government derives its force largely because it is locally

regarded as a step to annexation. Their present constitution is based upon annexation. If we reject annexation, the present authorities, to preserve their existence, their properties, constituting three-fourths of that on the islands, nay, their very lives, will offer the Republic to some other country on the condition of the preservation of themselves, their properties, and political rights. What, then, becomes of our protectorate? Whom can we protect when no one asks our protection? Grant our interference; does anyone dream that if the present Hawaiian Government offered to annex Hawaii to Japan, we could prevent that consummation except by an expensive, prolonged, and possibly dreadful war?

Or suppose no such offer is made, and we reject this treaty and resolution, and in due course of time Japan asserts the franchise right for her citizens in Hawaii, or that the natives qualify and vote; does anyone doubt that the then established Government, to secure its permanency, would turn to Japan or some other nation for support?

Or grant that the Government remains the same in Hawaii and our moral support the same, and Spain demands indemnity against Hawaii for not remaining neutral in the present war, and presents claim for permitting us to coal and supply in her ports on the way to the Philippines, does anyone doubt that this would be a valid claim under the laws of nations and in amount would be so great as to extend Spanish suzerainty over Hawaii? Is not here a moral consideration on our part to annex in order to save that little Republic the disaster her loyalty to our cause has imposed upon her?

Or grant that no one of these occurrences comes to pass, but that, present conditions prevailing, we become involved in a war with Japan or some other nation of first-class power possessing a navy equal or superior to ours, unless we shall have previously annexed and fortified Hawaii, how long before Hawaii would be invested by the enemy, fortified, and made a base of supplies to harass our western coast and destroy our commerce? What would the moral force of a protectorate avail then? And how long would it require for us to dislodge an enemy here? Our recent experiences at Santiago and Havana should be instructive. The terror of citizens, abandonment of resorts and business upon our seaboard, the frantic clamor from the coasts, even the Pacific, should bear fresh witness of the disasters occasioned even by the remotest possibilities of coast attack.

If a possibly rotten Spanish fleet at Cadiz terrorizes the Atlantic coast, what would be the condition of the public mind on the Pacific coast with a hostile Japanese fleet of first-class war ships, superior to ours, as she possesses, intrenched at Hawaii? I well remember that with the inferior Spanish fleet at Manila, guarded by the superior force of Dewey, when it was proposed to remove the *Oregon* and *Monterey* from the Pacific coast, a storm of protests from these good citizens was showered upon the Navy Department and the delegation in Congress. The amount of damage to the Pacific coast and commerce consequent upon the occupancy of Hawaii by an enemy in time of war would be incalculable.

This is not a speculative consideration. It is a reasonable probability, and as such, while we are determining this matter, should be avoided absolutely, completely, and forever by the annexation of these islands. The fact that under an existing protectorate the President and Government of this Republic wish to surrender their high offices and are imploring us to receive their independent sov-

ereignty as a dependency ought to demonstrate the incompetency of that protectorate to meet inevitable conditions, and ought at the same time to convince Congress that an imminent danger confronts us, whereupon, if we do not act, there may be lost to this country an opportunity of defense rarely offered in the life and situation of a nation.

If we fail to act in this emergency and upon this opportunity, where no other nation is protesting or will protest, at a time when Hawaii is begging to be annexed, at a time when the absolute necessity for these islands is demonstrated by their use by us in coaling and supplying our ships en route to the Philippines and in resting and refreshing our gallant soldiers thence bound, if we wait until the progress of time and the development of conditions present obstacles to annexation, in my judgment one of the gravest blunders of the century will have been committed by the wisest nation of the century.

The political status of the Hawaiian Government is unstable. A protectorate will not suffice; annexation alone is necessary to and will provide against all menacing contingencies upon our western coast. Therefore I conceive the imperative duty of the hour to be annexation.

The manifest duty of the hour to insure our defense in future wars, to remove a source of complications in future controversies, is to annex these islands. So long as they remain under their present and similar governments they will ever be a menace to the peace of this country by involving us in controversies over them. The solution and safety of the situation demand immediate annexation.

ANNEXATION WILL BENEFIT LABOR.

It is charged by the opponents of annexation that such will injure the condition of the laborers of this country. The mere suggestion of this statement is sufficient to warrant consideration, for if found true it should under ordinary circumstances control in the matter.

A correct understanding of the elements and forces involved argues the converse, that annexation will benefit the labor of this country. This phase of the question has been much befogged by a want of a clear understanding thereupon. Even so well informed a gentleman as Mr. Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, whom I deem and know personally to be an intelligent, honorable, and capable gentleman, has fallen into this error. In a letter addressed to Speaker REED a few days since he said:

The laborers are corralled in gangs of from twelve to sixteen, each gang having an overseer on horseback, armed with a whip with which diligence to labor is enforced.

The overwhelming number of contract slave laborers in Hawaii is employed in the sugar industry, and the master-employers have always insisted that the sugar industry can not be successfully conducted without this species of slave labor in those islands.

Though this point is contested, yet if Hawaii should become annexed to the United States the status of the laborers may not be changed; and if the Sandwich Islands, as a part of the United States, are permitted to continue a species of labor repugnant to the free institutions of our country, there is no safeguard against the extension of the same species of contract slave labor to the sugar industry of Louisiana and the cotton fields of the Southern States.

It required more than twenty years of constant organization, agitation, and education to legislatively close the gates of our country to the Chinese. The wisdom of that legislation had been demonstrated until there are few, if any, who now advocate its repeal. The annexation of Hawaii would, with one stroke of the pen, obliterate that beneficent legislation and open wide our gates, which would threaten an inundation of Mongolians to overwhelm the free laborers of our country.

The undesirable classes of inhabitants of these islands against whom criticism is leveled are the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiians.

So far as the Japanese residents are concerned, annexation will not change their status or rights. They can now enter these islands or the United States at will.

So far as the Hawaiians are concerned, the same considerations apply. Annexation will not permit a single additional native or Japanese to enter this country.

So far as the Chinese are concerned, the resolution contains a condition of annexation which not only prohibits the Chinese in Hawaii entering this country after annexation, but expressly prohibits any more Chinese entering Hawaii. The provision thereupon is:

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

So that, inasmuch as the Chinese can and do go to Hawaii from China and establish factories there, sending much of their products into this country free of duty under the existing reciprocity treaty, and as further emigration from China to Hawaii for that purpose will by annexation be prohibited, to that extent future competition by Chinese labor with our laborers will be stopped by annexation.

And inasmuch as much, or in fact the vast bulk, of the products and manufactures of the Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, and natives in Hawaii are now admitted into this country by treaty free of duty, and thus thrown into competition with our laborers' products, annexation can not injure our laborers.

But, as Mr. Gompers says, the vast majority of these are contract laborers and the sugar industry is run by them. Then, since this is true and this product of contract labor competes with a similar product of our laborers, coming in free of duty to our markets, that is the very best reason for annexation, because, when we annex these islands, instead of the United States being governed by their laws they will be governed by ours, one of which is that contract labor is unlawful. While this might not invalidate existing labor contracts, it would and certainly will prohibit new ones and mean the early extinction of contract labor in Hawaii.

The advantage of annexation to our laborers then will be the ultimate extinction of contract labor in Hawaii, which now competes in open market with our laborers. (The effect of this upon our beet-sugar industry I will speak of later.) To contend, as does Mr. Gompers, that annexation will extend these local Hawaiian contract-labor laws to the United States is to contend that instead of annexing Hawaii, coming in under our laws, we are annexing the United States to Hawaii, going in under their laws. This is *reductio ad absurdum*.

The experiences of mankind demonstrate that all inferior races decimate and become extinguished before the march of Anglo-Saxon civilization and laws. The annexation of Hawaii, with the Chinese exclusion condition quoted, means the extirpation from Hawaii of the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiians now competing in open market with our laborers. The invasion by Anglo-Saxons following annexation of these islands so guarantees. Since the enactment of the United States Chinese exclusion laws the num-

ber of Chinese in this country has been rapidly decreasing. So it will be when our exclusion laws are extended to Hawaii, as expressly provided by these resolutions. Indeed, the resolutions are stronger, for under them no Chinese whatever can go to Hawaii. The native Hawaiians have, in obedience to history, in past years been reduced from half a million to 30,000.

The following table shows the relative population of these islands in 1890 and 1896:

Nationality 1890 and 1896 compared.

Nationality.	1890.	1896.	Nationality.	1890.	1896.
Hawaiians	34,436	31,019	Britons	1,314	2,250
Part Hawaiians	6,186	8,485	Portuguese	8,002	15,191
Chinese	15,391	21,616	Germans	1,034	1,432
Americans	1,928	3,086	French	70	101
Hawaiian born, foreign parents	7,495	(*)	Other foreigners	419	600
Japanese	12,360	21,407	Polynesian	588	455
Norwegian	227	378	Total	89,660	102,029

* Divided into nationality of parents.

This table is instructive. It shows Japan's desire and attempt to populate these islands by a majority of her people, so as to acquire them; it shows annexation will limit the number of these by elimination of the possibility of accomplishing this purpose; it shows that a great influx of Chinese will be stopped; it shows that the natives are gradually becoming extinct. Increased Anglo-Saxon habitation will increase this. It shows, in short, that annexation will naturally diminish this alien competitive force of laborers—drive them out of these islands, where they hover under cover of the reciprocity treaty as competitors with our laborers.

The impetus given business by the insurance of a stable government by annexation will immediately populate these islands with such an influx of Americans that all other races must go before them. The Japanese and the Chinese, as soon or before their three or five years' labor contract expires, by necessity of law, will depart; the native in due course of his destiny will become extinct; so that annexation means the annihilation in these islands of contract labor now competing with our laborers in open market—a benefit rather than an injury to our laborers.

We should, if for no other reason, annex Hawaii so that by extending our contract-labor inhibiting laws thereto we can blot and drive from its shores the contract labor now competing with our laborers in open market. This alone, other things being equal, would justify annexation. The organized labor of the country realizes and appreciates this, as will be seen from the following:

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 13, 1898.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your inquiry of even date as to the feeling of "organized labor" on the question of the annexation of Hawaii, I beg leave to state that my individual opinion, based on thirty-three years' experience as a wage-earner and twenty years among organized men, constrains me to take issue with Mr. Gompers, who was quoted as opposed to annexation by Hon. CHAMBERLAIN, of Missouri, in his speech in the House of Representatives on Saturday last.

In this opinion Mr. Gompers should have been quoted as an individual and not as a representative of organized labor, and no man has authority to say that organized labor is for or against annexation, for the question has never been placed before organized labor.

Mr. Gompers himself, I am reliably informed, is a man of limited experience as a wage-earner, and does not correctly gauge the patriotic feeling among American workingmen, who desire to uphold in time of war the Ad-

ministration, regardless of their own political opinions, and he seems to ignore their oft-expressed desire to "extend commerce and multiply the opportunities to labor." My belief is that Mr. Gompers, on this question, stands almost alone, as I am informed he did at the last convention of his own organization on the anti-Cuban war resolution.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

A. M. LAWSON,

Master Workman District Assembly 66, Washington, D. C.

Hon. CHARLES H. GROSVENOR,

House of Representatives.

THE HOTEL RALEIGH, Washington, D. C., June 13, 1893.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your communication of the 11th instant concerning the position of organized labor on the annexation of Hawaii, permit me to state that I know of no labor organization, or any branch of it, which has taken any action on the matter. No doubt some members prominently identified with labor have expressed themselves on the subject one way or another as their individual opinions had led them, but the question has not received that consideration, to my knowledge, which the American workman does and should give to matters bearing on his interests.

Organized labor, in my opinion, should never be identified with partisan politics. We should at all times be free to strike an enemy or to assist a friend. In either case our memory should be good, irrespective of whatever his political party affiliations may be, for I hold that to advance the interests of organized labor is to advance the best interests of the state, and that is the first duty of every citizen worthy of the name. This is the school and the teaching which dominate the organizations which I have the honor to represent.

As to the annexation of Hawaii, which in no sense is a party issue, while it is true that we have not in any council or convention taken any position on the matter, it is also true that the sentiment of the great mass of the membership favor the proposition, as do many of their chief executive officers, as shown by the inclosed telegrams. This expression has become more pronounced as the apparent necessity grows since the brilliant victory of Manila. Such feelings are inspired by the same motives which prompted so many of our members to enter the volunteer service.

It is not at all probable that in the event of annexation the condition of labor in Hawaii would or could be transplanted to this country, no more than the quasi serfdom of Mexico would find lodgment under our Constitution, but, on the contrary, I submit there is every reason to believe that the advanced intelligence, conservatism, and patriotism of the organized American workman would meet such conditions and vastly improve them. There are so many illustrations that it would be idle to enumerate them.

Yours, truly,

W. F. HYNES.

Representing Brotherhood Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood Locomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, Order of Railway Telegraphers.

Hon. C. H. GROSVENOR,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MONTREAL, QUEBEC, June 14, 1893.

W. F. HYNES, Raleigh Hotel, Washington, D. C.:

As an American citizen, I am heartily in favor of the annexation of Hawaii.

F. P. SARGENT

Chief of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen.

PEORIA, ILL., June 14, 1893.

W. F. HYNES, care C. Grosvenor:

Answering your telegram, in my opinion the United States should annex the Hawaiian Islands. The necessity of our control over the islands in time of war is now apparent to everyone. Commercially, too, they are of great importance to us.

P. H. MORRISSEY,

Grand Master Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen.

CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA, June 14, 1893.

W. F. HYNES, The Raleigh, Washington, D. C.:

In the position which it seems the United States must hereafter occupy, I deem Hawaii a very valuable, if not indispensable, acquisition.

E. E. CLARK,

Chief Order of Railway Conductors.

It was observable and was of note that practically every one of those members of this House who are to-day opposing the annexation of Hawaii recently voted against the consideration in this House of the Lodge immigration bill. If it is this alleged incorporating into our population of about 100,000 of the inhabitants of Hawaii claimed to be undesirable which actuates their opposition, I commend to them the Lodge immigration bill, for almost every sixty or ninety days there comes to this country a greater number of foreign immigrants than the whole population of Hawaii, all of whom compete more actively with our wage-earners when here than will the population of Hawaii when annexed. This immigrant influx brings us no point of defense, no territory, no advantage as does annexation.

If Congress wishes to serve the laborers of this country, let it annex Hawaii, thereby inhibiting contract labor on the west, and shut down the gates of Castle Garden, thereby shutting out competition on the east.

ANNEXATION AND THE SUGAR BEET INDUSTRY IN AMERICA.

As the representative upon this floor of a district the soil and climate of large areas of which are admirably adapted to the development of the sugar beet, which infant industry is rapidly being undertaken by many of my constituents, I have considered long and thoroughly this phase of the question. At first suggestion I was impressed with a danger to the interests of our sugar-beet growers from annexation, but more mature consideration and study demonstrate to my mind that we have nothing to fear in this direction. On the contrary, annexation will place the American farmer in a better position to compete with the sugar producer of Hawaii.

We are to bear in mind continuously that for years past and under present conditions the sugar product of the Hawaiian Islands has come and now comes into this country duty free. This condition would not, of course, be changed by annexation, yet under this condition the sugar-beet industry of this country continues to thrive and develop and has grown to what it is to-day.

The only way these respective producers would be affected in a legal way would be that at an early day the Hawaiian producer would be deprived of the use of cheap contract labor, whereby the cost of production to him would be enhanced and he proportionally injured so far as his ability to compete with our producer is concerned.

Other conditions and facts bear upon their relative situations.

It is a fundamental economic proposition patently so true as to be idle to demonstrate, that where the demand is far in excess of supply there is no competition between producers.

There is not at present any competition between the Hawaiian and American producers of sugar, though they both sell in the same open market without any discriminating duty against the Hawaiian.

This country annually sends abroad \$100,000,000 in purchase of sugar consumed in this country in addition to that produced in both this country and Hawaii. We annually consume over 2,000,000 tons of 2,240 pounds each of sugar in this country, while the entire home and Hawaiian product for 1897, the largest ever produced, was but 528,000 tons. We, therefore, only produce one-fourth in both Hawaii and the United States of the sugar we consume, and, therefore, there can be and is no present competition

between the home and Hawaiian sugar producer. Hence the increased and increasing production of beet sugar in this country.

The possibility that conditions will ever be otherwise is very remote, if not improbable.

The American people are great sugar consumers. The records show that for the last twenty-three years the amount of sugar consumed each year in this country annually increased 12 per cent, and that by a most conservative estimate in fifteen years hence the American people will consume annually at least 4,000,000 tons of sugar.

With 84 per cent of our present consumption of sugar purchased abroad—that is, outside of Hawaii and this country—with the sugar demand increasing 12 per cent annually, it is absolutely impossible for this country and Hawaii for many years to come to supply this demand and thereby become competitors in our markets.

Some idea of the remoteness of this improbability may be had by the knowledge of the fact, as stated by Mr. Studniczka, whose words I will print, that an average-sized sugar factory producing 3,500 tons of sugar per annum costs \$350,000; that the number of such factories required to produce the quantity of sugar imported into this country in 1896 would be 506, costing \$177,000,000. There are now only 7 of such factories in this country, where 506 would be required if we manufacture all the sugar we consume.

Moreover, the annual increasing demand of 12 per cent per annum of sugar consumed would require the additional construction annually of 42 sugar factories costing \$14,700,000, or in ten years requiring 420 additional factories, at a cost of \$147,000,000, to manufacture and supply the increased demand alone. In other words, for this country in 1903 to meet the domestic demand for sugar it must construct 926 sugar factories of an annual product of 3,500 tons each, at a cost of \$325,000,000, whereas at present, with the development of that industry, we have only 7.

To contend that this will or can be done is to invade the bounds of absurdity; but unless it is and until it is done there will be no competition by Hawaiian beet-sugar growers with our beet-sugar growers.

But while time is seeking to accomplish this miracle another factor enters for consideration. As each year rolls by the ability of the Hawaiian sugar producer to compete with us is being weakened if not destroyed. We have already attempted to show that the accomplishment of annexation will be a severe blow to both the Hawaiian sugar grower and manufacturer, for by this he will be denied cheap contract labor. As these contracts only run for three and five years, in that time he will sustain a severe and, according to many, an irreparable blow, for his ability to produce sugar cheaply will be greatly diminished. He will be compelled as a competitor in our market to pay cost of transportation across the Pacific, which our farmer will not have to pay.

By reason of the facts that the Hawaiian lands will not produce in alternate seasons other profitable products they are compelled to crop each year, thereby sooner exhausting their soils and requiring the additional cost item of high-priced fertilizers, estimated to aggregate in 1896 at least \$700,000.

The extreme acreage of Hawaiian sugar lands is already tilled for that purpose. These do not exceed 100,000 acres and could not be made to exceed 20,000 acres more except by very expensive cultivation.

Though hitherto not developed, the Hawaiian lands are much better adapted to and can be more profitably farmed for coffee and subtropical fruits, products which we consume, but do not produce. American enterprise and capital in possession of these islands, under a stable government as a guaranty of investments, will soon substitute these for the less profitable sugar products. Of this Secretary Wilson says:

Hawaii, then, will not seriously compete with sugar producers in the States. When the people of those islands come to consider, with scientific assistance, the possibilities of coffee production that can be extended over much of the limited sugar belt, it will be found that in that industry they have a monopoly with which no State in the Union can interfere. It is a singular fact that no scientific improvement of the coffee tree with regard to the excellence of the berry and increased yield of the tree through intelligent selection has ever been made. The climate of these islands is admirably adapted to the production of many fine fruits that can not be grown in any of our States. They can grow many choice subtropical and tropical fruits that have never been scientifically developed, the improvement of which would lead to very profitable production. In these directions the farmers of the States could not compete with Hawaii.

To show that the facts and figures offered are based upon reliable authority I here insert the opinions of the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. H. S. Studniczek's letter to Senator Morgan, the former being one of the best experts of the day upon this subject. Secretary Wilson says:

IMPORTATIONS OF SUGAR.

The average amount of sugar imported into the United States annually from 1890 to 1897, inclusive, was 1,830,482 tons of 2,240 pounds each, valued at \$101,575,263. The importation during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, was 413,833 tons more than the average of the four preceding years, which was 1,522,647 tons, owing to the desire of importers to anticipate the effect of the tariff act pending in Congress during the last months of that year.

The average importation of sugar from the Hawaiian Islands from 1890 to 1897, inclusive, was 149,456 tons, valued at \$9,953,924. The importation for the fiscal year of 1897 was 192,508 tons, being 43,052 tons above the average of the preceding four years. During 1897 the Hawaiian sugar was 9.1 per cent of the amount consumed in the United States. From 1890 to 1897 it was 7.1 per cent of our consumption.

CONSUMPTION OF BEET SUGAR.

The beet sugar consumed in the United States in 1896 was 18 per cent, in 1897 it was 37 per cent, of the total consumption. The disturbed condition of Cuba doubtless caused much of this marked increase, but the beet sugars from countries in continental Europe are those from which we may expect the most active competition. The production of beet sugar in the United States in 1897 was 41,347 tons of 2,240 pounds each; of cane sugar, 287,067 tons, of maple sugar, 5,000 tons, and of sorghum sugar, 300 tons.

The total domestic product was 335,656 tons.

The total refined product of imported sugar was 1,760,697 tons, making the total annual consumption 2,096,253 tons.

From the foregoing it appears that 84 per cent of the sugar consumed in the United States was imported.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR FIELDS.

A prominent question is, Can this Hawaiian production be greatly increased in competition with the American farmer? Free entry into the United States from these islands has given great encouragement to the production of sugar, and the industry has been developed very rapidly. We must take into consideration methods of cultivation in Hawaii before we can certainly conclude what the future of the industry will be in that direction.

Sugar cane is grown continuously on the same land in Hawaii, and for this reason the soil is being exhausted. The planters are now compelled to buy commercial fertilizers. The three elements of plant food most necessary to vegetation are nitrogen, potassium, and phosphoric acid. Hawaiians will find saltpeter in Chile, potash at the Stassfurt mine in Germany, and phosphates in Florida. Guano on the islands of the Pacific is being exhausted and is quite expensive. When it becomes necessary to fertilize the soil in order to grow a crop, the expense becomes a considerable item and must be considered in determining what the effect of the competition would be on American sugar growers.

HAWAII CAN NOT COMPETE.

These considerations lead me to conclude that the system of agriculture pursued in Hawaii, which is certainly reducing the fertility of the soil, can not compete with a system of farm management in the United States, where the fertility of the soil is not at all reduced. We consume in the United States about 2,000,000 tons of sugar. Something like a million acres devoted to this purpose would produce all the sugar we import into our country at the present time, or 10 acres grown on each one of 100,000 farms, in rotation with other crops, would meet home demands and do no injury to the soils.

The American farmer will use this crop to diversify the farm system. The Hawaiian sugar grower is a one-crop man, and whenever one crop is perpetually grown, be it wheat or maize, beets or cane, cotton or tobacco, the available plant food in the soil is certain to be reduced below the point of profitable production and fertilizers are required.

Mr. Studniczka in a recent letter states:

As one of your fellow-citizens and a resident of the city of St. Louis since 1872, I desire to address you these few lines on behalf of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

Prior to coming to St. Louis I had been engaged in the beet-sugar industry of Austria. Then I superintended large sugar refineries here, and for the past twenty years my business has been that of manufacturing and selling sugar-cane fertilizers and dealing in all kinds of sugar machinery, in addition to the construction of sugar and glucose manufactories. * * *

All of my business interests are directly with the sugar and glucose producers of this country. I have no business relations with Hawaii or the Hawaiian sugar plantations and expect to have none. I am most intensely interested in the success of the beet-sugar industry of the United States, first, because I believe that it will be beneficial to my own business interests, and, second, because I believe it will be beneficial to this country as a whole, especially to the laboring interests. As evidence of my interest in this subject, I have written much and often concerning the beet-sugar industry, urging that measures be adopted to promote its establishment in this country. As a delegate to the last trans-Mississippi congress, held in July, 1887, at Salt Lake City, Utah, I presented to the congress an address upon the beet-sugar industry of this country, which is printed in their proceedings.

I make this preliminary statement in order that it may demonstrate to you that all of my personal interests are to aid and support the beet-sugar industry and the promotion of the domestic production of sugar in general.

* * * * *

I have noted with surprise that one of the principal reasons which appear to be urged against annexation is that it will injure the beet-sugar industry in the United States, and have therefore made investigation as to the facts and conditions in and concerning Hawaii, with a view to deciding in my own mind whether this objection were valid. As a result of my investigations, I was unhesitatingly convinced that the annexation of Hawaii will not be in any way injurious to either the domestic cane or beet sugar of this country.

SUGAR CONSUMPTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

The United States Government records show that the United States consumed during 1896 2,253,000 tons of sugar of 2,000 pounds each. Of this amount 269,000 tons were produced from cane grown in the United States and 41,500 tons from beets produced in the United States, and 176,000 tons were produced in Hawaii. Hawaii and the United States together therefore produced only 489,000 tons, requiring 1,773,000 tons to be imported from other countries.

The official statistics of the United States Government show that for twenty-three years the average annual increase of sugar consumed in the United States has been 12 per cent over that of the previous year. Even in these comparatively dull times the increased consumption for 1897 over that of 1896 was 136,000 tons. It is estimated by Mr. Willett, of Willett & Gray, sugar brokers of New York, one of the best-informed and most conservative sugar authorities of the world, that the consumption of sugar in the United States within fifteen years from now will not be less than 4,000,000 tons per annum. I consider this an entirely safe and conservative estimate.

LIMIT OF HAWAIIAN SUGAR PRODUCTION.

I have made myself familiar with the facts and figures concerning Hawaiian production of sugar. For twenty three years Hawaii has had a free and protected market in the United States for its raw sugar. Under this stimulating influence practically all of its lands available for cane culture have been brought into cultivation. The total area so in cultivation is less than 100,000 acres. A few thousand more acres can possibly be brought under cultivation by pumping water to an elevation of from 150 to 600 feet.

Even the area which this very expensive cultivation can bring into use is limited, not to exceed from 15,000 to 20,000 acres. The largest amount of

sugar ever produced in Hawaii in one year was about 240,000 tons. The largest amount that it ever can produce will probably not exceed about 300,000 tons. The area available for cane culture in Hawaii is so small that it requires almost continuous cultivation, which is extremely exhausting to the soil.

The present production of Hawaii is possible only by reason of the use of enormous amounts of high-grade and expensive fertilizers. For example, Hawaii imported during 1896 fertilizers to the amount of nearly \$550,000, besides which there were used of domestic fertilizers about the same amount. As they have no crop which they can rotate with cane, the exhaustion of the soil steadily continues, and can only be kept up by increasingly high fertilization. We can, therefore, be certain that the Hawaiian limit of production will be about 300,000 tons of sugar per annum.

FUTURE OF BEET SUGAR IN THIS COUNTRY.

The beet-sugar industry can, I firmly believe, be developed until it can furnish all the sugar which this country requires; but it will take many years to accomplish this. Some idea of what will have to be done before domestic beet sugar can supply this country with all the sugar it consumes can be derived from the following figures: An average-sized beet-sugar factory, producing 3,500 tons of sugar per annum, will cost, say, \$350,000. It would have required 506 beet-sugar factories, costing \$177,000,000, to produce the sugar imported into this country in 1896 from countries other than Hawaii.

If the annual increase in consumption of the United States is only, say, 150,000 tons per annum, instead of 12 per cent, as it has been for twenty-three years past, it would require each year 42 additional factories, costing each year \$14,700,000, or within ten years from now it would require 420 additional factories, costing \$147,000,000, to supply the increase in consumption alone.

That is to say, by 1908 it will require, in round numbers, 1,000 beet-sugar factories, each capable of an annual product of 3,500 tons, costing \$350,000,000, to supply the sugar, which will otherwise be imported from some other country to supply the needs of the United States. There are now only 7 beet-sugar factories in operation in the United States.

Even though the highest expectations of the friends of beet sugar are realized, do they believe that 1,000 beet-sugar factories will be established in this country within the next ten years? Until the domestic beet-sugar industry is able to supply the market of the United States the sugar from Hawaii can not injure the beet-sugar producers of the United States; besides, there will be an unsupplied market, with the price fixed by the price of sugar throughout the world. The only way in which the domestic beet-sugar producer can be injured by Hawaiian sugar is that the Hawaiian producer should undersell him. But the Hawaiian planter will not sell his sugar below the market price unless there is some reason for so doing, and there can be no reason so long as there is a market in which both he and the American planter will be protected by the American tariff.

Therefore neither Hawaiian nor domestic United States producers will be obliged to lower their prices in order to obtain a market.

NO CHEAPER IN HAWAII THAN HERE.

The beet-sugar producers of this country do not consider the cane-sugar planters of Louisiana a menace to their industry. Why should they consider the sugar raised in Hawaii a menace to them? If Hawaii becomes American territory, the cane sugar of Louisiana and the cane sugar of Hawaii will both stand in the same relation to the beet-sugar producers. Both will continue to produce a limited amount, while the great field for expansion will be occupied by the beet-sugar industry, with opportunity to expand for many years to come far more rapidly than capital seems likely to be available.

With every personal reason to oppose Hawaiian annexation, if it would in fact be injurious to the domestic sugar business of the United States, and looking at the question from a purely selfish aspect, I can see no reason for believing that the annexation of Hawaii will in any manner whatsoever injure either the beet or the cane sugar industry of the United States, while there seems every reason to believe that it will be beneficial to every business class in the country. As a broad measure of national policy, and as an American citizen, I sincerely hope that your honorable body will set aside all claims that personal interests may bring before you against the annexation of Hawaii, and keep in mind only the great strategic advantage to our nation and our flag, and that the annexation of Hawaii may be consummated at an early date.

So that a critical examination of all the facts discloses that the Hawaiian sugar producer is not to-day a competitor with the American sugar producer; that it will require years, if ever, for him to become such; that when this would become possible, distance to markets, the increased cost of his labor, the deterioration

of his soils, and the limits of his acreage would, if he continued in business, practically eliminate him as a competitor; while every reason indicates that long before then these disadvantages and coexistent advantages will have diverted his efforts into another field of production, not, possibly, competitive with us, and he will have entirely surrendered the sugar-producing field to our farmers. Inasmuch as, therefore, annexation will not possibly disadvantage our sugar producers now selling in open market their sugar products with the Hawaiians, but will be a great factor in reducing the competitive strength of the Hawaiian producer in this respect and turn his efforts to another field of production, I say annexation will be a benefit and not an injury to the American beet-sugar industry.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

The Congressional records of a hundred years past, covering all the glorious epochs marking the expansion of the confines of this Republic from the thirteen original States to the present broad expanse, witnesses the same learned disquisitions upon constitutional law, the same declamations upon "imperialism" having been expounded in Congress in opposition to each of the steps of our nation to the present territorial limits. Yet no member here to-day would undo any of these acts. It is a poor commentary upon the wisdom of the fathers to assert that there was denied this sovereignty in its charter of creation, the power to adjust itself to inevitable growth, population, and welfare.

From my limited point of view this question seems foreclosed not only by the express words of the Constitution, but by the decisions of the Supreme Court thereupon and the recognized policy of over a century.

Section 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States says:

The Congress shall have power to * * * provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.

That the annexation of these islands is necessary both for the common defense and to promote the general welfare, I have already endeavored to show.

So the powers granted Congress to "make treaties" and to "declare war" have likewise been held sufficient to warrant the acquisition of territory whenever the same was incident to the subject-matter thereof.

The Constitution nowhere expressly authorizes or prohibits Congress acquiring territory, but since the full and complete exercise of the powers expressly granted Congress above cited at times necessarily require the acquisition of territory, these necessary powers must by all rules of construction be deemed included in the grants named.

Nor is Congress limited to any particular procedure, as by treaty or joint resolution, in its exercise of the power providing for the general defense. This is so vital a power to the existence of the sovereignty itself that the framers of the Constitution evidently did not appreciate the high national importance of marking this distinction.

That with the express grant of power in the Constitution is included the incidental power of acquiring territory when necessary has been often decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In one of these opinions Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, says:

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the power of making wars and making treaties; consequently the Government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or treaty.

That opinion was rendered in the great case of the American Insurance Company *vs.* Canter.

And again, in the celebrated case of Mormon Church *vs.* The United States, the same court says:

The power to acquire territory is derived from the treaty making power and the power to declare and carry on war. * * * The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty and belong to all independent governments.

There can be no question, then, that when the acquisition of territory is necessary to "the common defense" or to "promote the general welfare" that the incidental power is granted.

To deny this power now is to reopen the settled debate and policy of this Government for over one hundred years. The Constitution confers plenary powers for this purpose, and whether their exercise shall be by treaty or resolution affects and is affected by the exigencies of the occasion only and in nowise negatives the existence of this power fundamental to sovereign existence.

The exercise of this power at intervals for over a hundred years has grown up with the nation and developed one of its settled policies and prerogatives as sacred as the written Constitution itself. Through it the area of the country has expanded from 800,000 to 3,600,000 square miles. Through it we have extended our confines from Ohio to and including Alaska, 1,500 miles distant overland to the north, and the Aleutian Islands, 500 miles West of Hawaii. Through it, step by step, we acquired Louisiana in 1803, Florida in 1819, California, New Mexico, and Arizona in 1849, and Alaska in 1867. Sometimes by treaty, sometimes by resolution, always for the general welfare and for the common defense; and no one here will deny, though it was then denied, that each of these steps did add to the "common defense" and promote the "general welfare."

So as the confines of our country have been gradually extended westward, occupying step by step every vantage an enemy might occupy, we are now not inaugurating a new policy or exercising a new power in annexing Hawaii, but exercising a written, adjudicated, often exercised constitutional power in the "consummation" of a policy of our country pursued for over a century, and which no man will deny has in each case added to the common defense and promoted the general welfare, and which no man will in the future deny was so and well done in this case.

I take it that the broad powers of providing for the "common defense" and "promoting the general welfare" granted Congress by our Constitution were intended to embrace in a few words those inherent powers of every independent sovereignty to do every act necessary to preserve the independent existence of that sovereignty or which will promote the weal, development, and well-being of it and its people. So reading our Constitution, I believe that in voting for the annexation of Hawaii I am obeying the oath taken upon assuming a seat in this House to support that Constitution of the United States of America.

EDUCATION IN HAWAII.

One of the frequent objections urged to annexation is the statement that the Hawaiians are a "mixed, mongrel, ignorant race." This is not only inconsistent, but without foundation in fact.

We are 75,000,000, they 109,000. If all of them were ignorant, their precipitation in our midst would only result in their enlightenment and not our retrogression. I have already stated that often at intervals of sixty or ninety days an equal number of ignorant are thrust upon us from European ports, and have not lowered our standard of intelligence or morality, though they do injure our laborers by competing with them in our labor markets.

If it is true that the Hawaiians are so ignorant, we should annex at once, upon the reasoning of the minority—for they here contend for a protectorate over these people, and it is admitted our Government is committed to and now maintains that quasi responsibility for their conduct, and I insist that if we are to be responsible for their national conduct in the probable complications of the twentieth century we should have a right to control their acts. This would be necessary that we prevent being led into international controversies by them. Here annexation would prevent such rather than complicate us with other nations.

But the intelligence of a people has never been so recklessly mistaken or misstated as that of the Hawaiians. It seems we are accustomed to assume their ignorance, when, in fact, man for man, they are as well educated as almost any people on the globe. Indeed, their standard of education compares well with that of any State of the Union. Almost every adult Hawaiian can read, write, and speak the English language. That is the language taught in their schools. About one-half of the Portuguese on these islands are equally as well educated. The remarkable showing is made that their laws require compulsory education, and that of 14,286 eligibles, 14,023 children actually attended school in 1896. Their school system compares favorably with any of the world, as shown by the following table:

Number of schools, teachers, and pupils for the year 1896.

	Schools.	Teachers.			Pupils.		
		Male.	Female.	Total.	Male.	Female.	Total.
Government.....	132	111	169	280	5,754	4,435	10,189
Independent.....	63	72	130	202	1,994	1,840	3,834
Total.....	195	183	299	482	7,748	6,275	14,023

Annexation, therefore, would not bring us a mongrel, ignorant race, but a race whose standard of education is good, and among whom is already established schoolhouses and a school system rarely excelled.

If, however, these islands are necessary to our defense and welfare, why should this great nation shrink from its duty on account of 109,000 ignorant people, be it granted? I am one who has more confidence in the moral and educational forces of my country. Annex, provide for our defense and welfare, and if elevation is there needed this great nation is equipped with the necessary forces to educate and moralize the acquired.

Indeed, we are fortunate to be able to acquire so valuable an outpost for the national defense by having to assimilate so few of

objectionable population. We find here a government based upon ours, a people whose language and institutions are ours, whose laws are ours, whose schools teach our language, whose sentiments and patriotism respect and hold holy the holidays of our country—a more assimilative country could rarely be found.

CONTIGUITY.

“Two thousand miles away” is a phrase which seems always to delight the opponent of annexation. He loves to roll these words about his tongue and his tongue about them. But national contiguity is measured by hours and not by miles. In considering the advantages and movements of the commerce, of the militia, and of the great navies of the world, miles are no longer considered, but the hours measuring these movements are the sole consideration. The presence of currents, of winds, of access by rail, of relative motive powers, compel this.

Within this rule Hawaii is far within the precedents. She is nearer Washington than was the nearest borders of Louisiana in 1803, than was Florida in 1819, California in 1849, or Alaska in 1867 or to-day. She is nearer Washington in miles to-day than portions of Alaska, than the Aleutian Islands, and the Midway Islands, hundreds of miles west of Hawaii, owned by us and attempted to be made a naval station by us with the loss of \$50,000 expended and a war ship wrecked.

CONSENT OF THE ANNEXED INHABITANTS.

It is insisted that we have no moral right to annex, and that it is not in conformity with the high principles of this Government to extend its dominion without consent of those absorbed.

The absurdity of this proposition as an abstract one is shown by history. This has never been the practice excepting in the case of Texas. We did not consult the Indians of Florida; we consulted only the governing power, Spain. We did not consult the Indians of Louisiana; we consulted only the governing power, France. We did not consult the half-breeds of California; we consulted only the governing power, Mexico. We did not consult the Eskimos of Alaska; we consulted only the governing power, Russia.

So with Hawaii it is sufficient to consult the Republic authorities, the recognized governing power, and not the Chinese and Japanese, the latter having been sent there to prevent, if possible, annexation. That this is the desire of the Hawaiians outside of a few interested royalists is attested by the fact that resolutions favoring annexation were unanimously adopted by their House of Representatives, a large majority of whom and the speaker of which were and are full-blooded Hawaiians.

Thus it appears that while our friends insist this question should be first submitted to a popular vote of those whom they charge to be mongrels and ignorant, I submit this is neither the established practice, nor is it necessary in the present case to ascertain the popular will of those entitled to be consulted.

Granting that we are forcing upon these so-called ignorant our Government, can anyone conceive of a greater godsend being forced upon any nation? When there is crystallized in our Government those liberty-preserving principles for which mankind has fought since creation and which are the envy of all civilized nations, to force upon these so-called mongrels these benign principles and this magnificent Government, insuring them our lib-

erty, protecting them with our powers, is certainly a spectacle and a crime which must strike dumb with awe the whole world.

It can only be compared with that inhuman cruelty which prompts a good mother to punish her babe with a dose of castor oil, seemingly useless, cruel, barbarous at the time, but possibly the child will be spared long enough to learn that it was that which spared his life and preserved his health and to appreciate that after all there is no one like a mother.

ANNEXATION IS THE DEMOCRATIC POLICY.

The nineteenth century opened with Thomas Jefferson, the founder of Democracy, founding the areal basis of this great Republic by the annexation of Louisiana in 1803. Following in his illustrious footsteps and blazing the forests in the same direction in pursuit of the policy of annexation were James Monroe, a Democrat, who in 1819 annexed Florida; James K. Polk, a Democrat, who in 1845 annexed Texas and in 1849 annexed California; Franklin Pierce, a Democrat, who in 1853 made the Gadsden purchase.

Alaska alone of all the great annexed domain of this country came in under other than Democratic administration, a policy which has increased the area of the Republic from 815,615 square miles to over 3,600,000 square miles, and now we are told that the further annexation of 6,000 square miles in Hawaii is not a Democratic policy and that this means national destruction. The Democratic party has made mistakes and accomplished good, has suffered defeats and gained successes, but the grandest of all its achievements and greatest glory of that party is that it has founded the areal basis of the greatest of republics. History has inseparably linked with Democracy the laying of the structural foundation of this great country.

The past century has dedicated to the cause of mankind through the Democratic policy this broad and expansive area. Its inception was marked and the policy founded at the commencement of the century by Jefferson. God forbid that this policy shall be impeded at the close of this century by the party founded by Jefferson. The annexation of Hawaii means the consummation of that policy, and it is fitting that it should be completed at the close of the century at the commencement of which it was inaugurated. Let the nineteenth century witness the consummation of this great work by the acquisition of the last necessary piece of territory which makes a boundless ocean the natural defender of the great work of a century of glorious Democratic policy.

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF HAWAII.

While the United States generally is benefited by the trade with Hawaii, California is particularly so. The following is a statement of San Francisco's commerce alone, showing Hawaii her second best customer, for the year ending November 30, 1896: *Table showing comparative importance of San Francisco exports to Hawaii, and to some other countries, for the year ending November 30, 1896.*

Australia	\$3,932,000
Hawaii	3,588,000
All of Central America	3,440,000
China	2,939,000
Japan	2,270,000
Mexico	1,469,000
All Europe, except Great Britain	1,446,000
All of Asia and Oceania, except China and Japan	1,298,000
New Zealand, Samoa, Marquesas, Cook, Fiji, Friendly, Marshall, Caroline, and all other Polynesian islands combined	684,000
British Columbia	431,000
All of South America	294,000

Hawaii is San Francisco's second best foreign wine customer, her third best purchaser of salmon, her third largest consumer of barley, and her sixth best consumer of flour. In 1896 Hawaii imported 76 per cent of her imports, aggregating \$5,461,208, from the United States.

Under existing conditions Hawaii has here a free market for but practically three of her products—sugar, rice, and bananas. Her general tariff of 10 per cent has allowed about 25 per cent of her imports to come from other countries than the United States. If we annex, this restriction will be removed as to us and we will surround her with our tariff of over 50 per cent against the world, which will give us all her trade.

If we do not annex and some other country does, our trade will be cut off entirely by a similar tariff to ours thrown around Hawaii by the annexing country. Our merchants, manufacturers, and producers of California, walled off from the East by mountain ranges and exorbitant railroad rates, have found in Hawaii a good customer. We sell her our wines, flour, hay, barley, and many other products. This with only 109,000 population. Annex, and our trade will be multiplied many fold, besides selling her the 25 per cent now purchased by her from other countries. This means an increased demand for the products of our California farmer and merchant. It means the employment of more labor by them to meet this increased demand and higher wages for the laborer.

Refuse to annex and permit some other country to do so, and we lose the greater part, if not all, of our existing trade with Hawaii. Hawaiian trade brings many millions of dollars to the San Francisco merchants each year. Locally speaking, my constituents whose markets are in San Francisco profit much by this, for the more demand there is of the San Francisco merchant, the more money paid to him, the more demand he has for my constituents' produce and the more money to pay for it. Annexation, therefore, means for my constituents more demand for their products, more money to pay for them, and a consequent greater demand by them for more labor and higher prices for the same.

The foreign trade of Hawaii is already phenomenal. In 1896 it amounted to \$208 per capita for each man, woman, and child in that country, a record unparalleled in history. The total number of American vessels entering American ports in the year ending June 30, 1896, were 489, and of these 191 were from Hawaii; that is, Hawaii furnished cargoes for 191 American ships, while all the world besides furnished cargoes for only 298 such. After annexation all Hawaiian trade must under the law be carried in American bottoms, for this then becomes coast trade. As our tariff will bar out trade between other countries and Hawaii and turn the Hawaiian trade to this country, after annexation all Hawaiian commerce will be carried in American ships, the number of which will soon be doubled, all to the immense advantage of this country, and California in particular.

Be the population of Hawaii what it may, it is to-day the greatest commercial country for its size and the number of its population on the globe, and is in the same ratio the best customer of the Pacific coast. Why should we of the coast, then, fling aside the golden opportunity to secure more firmly this customer, if not prevent its absolute loss to our country? We need not speculate upon future possibilities, but I rest my case upon the proposition

that annexation of Hawaii is vital to the prosperity of the State of California.

THE NICARAGUA CANAL.

Inseparably connected with the annexation of Hawaii as a military and commercial outpost is the construction of the Nicaragua Canal. This should be done and owned by the United States Government, and no other party or power. No enterprise of modern times will work the results which will be accomplished by the construction of this canal. High freight rates between East and West will be matters of the past. The Atlantic and Pacific States will be 10,000 miles nearer. European markets will be 7,000 miles nearer California, and the Orient will be 6,000 miles nearer New York. It doubles the effectiveness of our Navy by enabling the Atlantic squadron to defend the Pacific, and that of the Pacific to defend the Atlantic.

With the Nicaragua Canal and the "Key of the Pacific," Hawaii, as naval and commercial agencies of the United States, the dominion, commerce, and safety of our Government are secured. With these we can marshal our armies and exploit our navies from Occident to Orient far more rapidly than any other power on the face of the globe. With these we can control and direct the commerce of the two hemispheres; we can successfully project our commerce into the great regions of Siberia, China, and the Oceanic isles as well vend it at the doors of Europe.

NOT IMPERIALISM.

It is unfortunate that the consideration of this question is made necessary at the present time. The glorious victory of the gallant Dewey at the Philippines and his occupation there have led the opponents of the annexation of Hawaii to level against the latter arguments entirely addressed to the question of annexing the former. We have introduced here frequently the words "imperialism," "national aggrandizement," "land grabbers," and other similar terms. It is only one more evidence of the weakness of the case of the opponents of annexation of Hawaii when they inveigh here such entirely superfluous and irrelevant considerations. The absence of a capacity to discriminate is always unfortunate.

The annexation of Hawaii involves not the first elements of imperialism. On the contrary, if it is anything, it is the consummation of consolidation and concentration. It involves only and is for the national defense and welfare, the preservation intact of existing compact territory, and the promotion of the welfare thereof alone. It is for consolidation, not extension. It is but the consummation of a century's great work and policy marked out by Jefferson, pursued by Pierce, Polk, and other eminent Democrats, in rendering impregnable by natural fortifications this great Republic and promoting the welfare thereof.

One of the essential elements of colonization and imperialism is the gathering in as dependencies countries of different tongues, habits, laws, and institutions. That is wanting here, for, as I have already said, the Hawaiians speak our tongue, teach our language in their schools, imitate our laws, copy our institutions, celebrate our holidays. They are already Americanized and assimilated.

Independent of the existence of the present war and the exigencies thereof, I find cogent reasons confirming the conviction of the necessity for annexing Hawaii.

The war has served only to emphasize and confirm this conclusion. It has unexpectedly and incomparably in a moment flashed before the world a situation in the Philippines where the proper conduct of the war, the proper succor of our Navy and Army, and the comfort and health of many of our soldier neighbors en route to serve our country imperatively require that we control Hawaii.

I have voted to declare this war, I have voted to bring on the conditions at the Philippines, I have voted to intrust our nation's honor and vindication in the hands of our present President, and having so done, and he having declared annexation necessary thereto, I shall vote therefor to uphold his hands in this crisis, being convinced as I am that it is entirely necessary and for the best interests of the Republic.

I do not consider any question of foreign policy is here involved, but solely a question of the nation's defense, welfare, and present military necessity.

Even were a question of foreign policy here involved, I would deem it unwise for any Representative or party to adopt at this time a fixed policy with reference thereto. War is an extraordinary occasion which brings to nations extraordinary duties and the necessity of the exercise of varied functions and acts. Particularly is this true of a nation's foreign policy in time of war with a foreign power. It can not with reference to such war and the opposing nation safely adopt any fixed territorial policy, and all fixed policies should be excepted in case of war.

The great means to success in war are by destroying the enemy's army and navy, demolishing her cities, exhausting her revenues, and conquering and occupying her territory.

If the enemy be a foreign power and we announce in advance that we will not acquire foreign territory, we waive in advance and deny ourselves one of the most successful means to a successful conclusion of the war. The enemy should know that we mean not only to invade her territory, but hold it if necessity demands, that fear of this loss may induce peace.

War always carries the successful belligerent beyond original demands. At the inception of this war our Government, in the interest of peace and in harmony with its definite purpose to establish liberty in Cuba peacefully, if possible, but by war if necessary, announced in its declaration of war which was made and sent to Spain as an ultimatum that Cuban independence was all we desired, and expressly negated the idea of desiring to acquire any of Spain's territory.

This was contemptuously refused; was not even received, much less considered, by that country. That being the case, our attitude now and Spain's expectations must be that we shall pursue peace through war, vigilantly availing ourselves of all the recognized means thereto, including the acquisition of Spanish territory and possessions. This accords with every war by civilized nations. Our forefathers in the war of the Revolution demanded only certain concessions as to taxes, etc.; but, war being necessary thereto, they demanded and secured the legitimate results of the situation eventuated by that war—*independence*.

In this war and at this time territorial policies of this Government should not be mooted. Spain should know that to successfully prosecute this war we will conquer and hold, if necessary, not only the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, nay, even Spain herself. That we will invade these and strip her of every vestige of



territory. Any other policy denies us the most potent means to successful war.

It will be early enough for us to discuss whether we will hold any or all of these after the great and paramount object of the hour is accomplished—the suit for peace by Spain—until which no avenue of success should be abandoned or its abandonment discussed. When the treaty of peace is to be signed and indemnity paid us, these possessions—commercial outposts and naval stations therein, always desirable—can be mooted and determined. Until then let us, as a united people, demand of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, aggressive war, and uphold his hands in all he requires to that end.

Let us remember that the supreme duty of the hour is the vindication of American honor stained by the great insult of a contemptible power and the upholding the cause of liberty to which this Republic is dedicated; let us pray that we will come forth a united, peaceful, happy, and God-fearing people; let us hope that out of the ranks of war, out of the smoke and din of battle, out of the rejoicings over victories by land and by sea our nation will emerge and then wisely meet all questions of future policy, domestic and foreign, and solve them wisely and properly as becomes the stability and future of a Republic founded upon the intelligence of its citizens and dedicated to the cause of freedom.

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